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A COMPUTABILITY-THEORETIC REFORMULATION OF
THE CONNES EMBEDDING PROBLEM
ISAAC GOLDBRING AND BRADD HART
Abstract. The Connes Embedding Problem (CEP) asks whether ev-
ery separable II1 factor embeds into an ultrapower of the hyperfinite II1
factor. We show that the CEP is equivalent to the computability of the
universal theory of every type II1 von Neumann algebra. We also derive
some further computability-theoretic consequences of the CEP.
1. Introduction
Let R denote the hyperfinite II1 factor. In his seminal paper [4], Connes
proved that L(Fn), the group von Neumann algebra of the free group of rank
n, embeds into an ultrapower RU of R. He then casually remarked that “Ap-
parently such an imbedding ought to exist for all (separable) II1 factors...”
This seemingly innocuous statement is now referred to as the Connes Em-
bedding Problem (hereafter referred to as the CEP) and is arguably the most
important open problem in the theory of II1 factors. Due to the work of
Kirchberg and others, there are now many equivalent formulations of the
CEP spanning nearly all parts of operator algebras as well as various areas
outside of operator algebras such as geometric group theory and noncommu-
tative real algebraic geometry; see [3] for a survey on the many equivalents
of CEP.
In the article [6], it is shown how to view tracial von Neumann algebras as
structures in a particular continuous logic suited for studying structures from
analysis. Moreover, is shown how the classes of tracial von Neumann algebras
and II1 factors form axiomatizable classes in this logic. In the sequel [7], the
authors observe that CEP is actually equivalent to the logical statement that
every II1 factor has the same universal theory as R. Roughly speaking, this
means that, for any quantifer-free formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) (which is essentially
just a continuous function applied to the traces of various ∗polynomials in
the variables x1, . . . , xn), where x1, . . . , xn range over the unit ball of a II1
factor, we have
sup{ϕ(~a) : ~a ∈ R1} = sup{ϕ(~b) : ~b ∈M1}
for any II1 factor M . It is then immediate that this latter statement is
equivalent to its existential version, obtained by replacing sup’s by inf’s,
Goldbring’s work was partially supported by NSF grant DMS-1262210.
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which is often called the Microstate Conjecture, a well-known equivalent to
the CEP.
In this paper, we use the CEP to show that the universal theory of R
is computable, meaning that there is an algorithm such that, given any
quantifier-free formula ϕ(~x) and any dyadic rational ǫ > 0 as input, re-
turns an interval I ⊆ R (with dyadic rational endpoints) of length at most ǫ
such that sup{ϕ(~a) : a ∈ R1} ∈ I. (Of course, such an algorithm will then
also exist for existential sentences.)
Trivially, the result of the previous paragraph shows that, assuming CEP,
every type II1 von Neumann algebra has a computable universal theory (as
its universal theory coincides with the universal theory of R). What if in-
stead one started with the assumption that every type II1 von Neumann
algebra has a computable universal theory? Consider the algorithm that
starts comparing the values of universal sentences in R with other II1 fac-
tors; if CEP failed, this algorithm would eventually tell us so, otherwise, the
algorithm would run forever. Thus, the assumption that every type II1 von
Neumann algebra has a computable universal theory would only help one
verify that CEP failed (if CEP were in fact false). Unfortunately, this line
of thought is doomed to fail. Indeed, we prove that, if every type II1 von
Neumann algebra has a computable universal theory, then the CEP holds.
The key point here is to show that if the CEP fails, then it “fails very badly”
in the sense that if there are at least two distinct universal theories of type
II1 algebras, then there are continuum many such universal theories.
In the last section, we derive further computability-theoretic consequences
of the CEP.
A curious byproduct of our results is that both sides of the CEP vs.
NCEP (not CEP) debate will find something useful here to consider in their
endeavors. Indeed, if one is trying to prove that CEP is true, then it seems
a priori easier to show that all universal theories of type II1 algebras are
decidable rather than equal. And if one is trying to prove NCEP, then the
strong computability-theoretic consequences derived from CEP should be
seen as strong evidence that the CEP is far too strong to be true.
We would like to thank David Sherman for a helpful conversation regard-
ing this project.
2. Prerequisites from Logic
In this paper, by a tracial von Neumann algebra we mean a pair (A, tr),
where A is a von Neumann algebra and tr is a faithful, normal trace on A.
However, we often suppress mention of the trace and simply say “Let A be a
tracial von Neumann algebra...” (This causes no confusion when A is a II1
factor for then the trace on A is unique.)
For a von Neumann algebra A, we let A1 denote the operator norm unit
ball.
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Let F denote the set of all ∗-polynomials p(x1, . . . , xn) (n ≥ 0) such that,
for any von Neumann algebra A, we have p(An1 ) ⊆ A1. For example, the
following functions belong to F :
• the “constant symbols” 0 and 1 (thought of as 0-ary functions);
• x 7→ x∗;
• x 7→ λx (|λ| ≤ 1);
• (x, y) 7→ xy;
• (x, y) 7→ x+y2 .
We then work in the language L := F ∪ {trR, trℑ, d}, where trℜ (resp.
trℑ) denote the real (resp. imaginary) parts of the trace and d denotes the
metric on A1 given by d(x, y) := ‖x − y‖2. We can then formulate certain
properties of tracial von Neumann algebras using the language L as follows.
Basic L-formulae will be formulae of the form trℜ(p(~x)) or trℑ(p(~x)) for
p ∈ F . Quantifier-free L-formulae are formulae of the form f(ϕ1(~x), . . . , ϕm(~x)),
where f : Rm → R is a continuous function and ϕ1, . . . , ϕm are basic L-
formulae. Finally, an arbitrary L-formula is of the form
Q1x1∈B1 · · ·Q
k
xk∈B1
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn),
where k ≤ n, ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is a quantifier-free formula, and each Q
i is either
sup or inf; we think of these Qi’s as quantifiers over the unit ball of the
algebra. If each Qi is sup (resp. inf), then we say that the formula is
universal (resp. existential).
Remarks 2.1.
(1) Our setup here is a bit more special than the general treatment of
continuous logic in [1], but a dense set of the formulae in [1] are
logically equivalent to formulae in the above form, so there is no loss
of generality in our treatment here.
(2) In order to keep the set of formulae “separable”, when forming the set
of quantifier-free formulae, we restrict ourselves to a countable dense
subset of the set of all continuous functions Rm → R as m ranges
over N. In fact, one can take this countable dense set to be “finitely
generated” which is important for our computability-theoretic con-
siderations. (See [2].)
Suppose that ϕ(~x) is a formula, A is a tracial von Neumann algebra, and
~a ∈ An1 , where n is the length of the tuple ~x. We let ϕ(~a)
A denote the
real number obtained by replacing the variables ~x with the tuple ~a; we may
think of ϕ(~a)A as the truth value of ϕ(~x) in A when ~x is replaced by ~a. For
example, if ϕ(x1) is the formula supx2 d(x1x2, x2x1), then ϕ(a)
A = 0 if and
only if a is in the center of A.
If ϕ(~x) is a formula, then there is a bounded interval [mϕ,Mϕ] ⊆ R
such that, for any tracial von Neumann algebra A and any ~a ∈ A, we have
ϕ(~a)A ∈ [mϕ,Mϕ].
If ϕ has no free variables (that is, all variables occurring in ϕ are bound by
some quantifier), then we say that ϕ is a sentence and we observe that ϕ(~a)A
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is the same as ~a ranges over all tuples of A of the appropriate length, whence
we denote it simply by ϕA. Given a tracial von Neumann algebra, the theory
of A is the function Th(A) which maps the sentence ϕ to the real number
ϕA. (Sometimes authors define Th(A) to consists of the set of sentences ϕ
for which ϕA = 0; since Th(A), as we have defined it, is determined by its
zeroset, these two formulations are equivalent.) If we restrict the function
Th(A) to the set of all universal (resp. existential) sentences, the resulting
function is defined to be the universal (resp. existential) theory ofA, denoted
Th∀(A) (resp. Th∃(A)). We should also mention that, as a consequence of
Łos’ theorem, we have Th(A) = Th(AU ) for any ultrafilter U .
Remark 2.2 (For the logicians). In what follows, we will restrict ourselves
to L-structures that are tracial von Neumann algebras. We can do this
because it is shown that the class of (unit balls of) tracial von Neumann
algebras forms a universally axiomatizable class of L-structures.
Let T be a set of L-sentences. We say that a tracial von Neumann algebra
A models T , written A |= T , if ϕA = 0 for each ϕ ∈ T . It is shown in [6]
that there is a set TII1 of L-sentences such that A |= TII1 if and only if A is
a II1 factor. In fact, there is a recursive such set TII1 , meaning that there is
an algorithm which determines, upon input a sentence σ, whether or not σ
belongs to TII1 . The aforementioned observation will be crucial for what is
to follow and so we isolate it:
Fact 2.3. The class of II1 factors is recursively axiomatizable.
Up until now, we have been treating tracial von Neumann algebras se-
mantically. It will be crucial to also treat them syntactically. In [2], a proof
system for continuous logic is established. In our context, this gives meaning
to the phrase “the axioms TII1 can prove the sentence σ,” which we denote
TII1 ⊢ σ.
Fact 2.4. The set {σ : TII1 ⊢ σ} is recursively enumerable, meaning that
there is an algorithm that runs forever and continually returns those σ for
which TII1 ⊢ σ.
Proof. This follows immediately from the existence of the proof system de-
veloped in [2] together with Fact 2.3. 
There is a connection between the semantic and syntactic treatments de-
veloped above (which [2] refers to as “Pavelka-style completeness”). Let
−. : R2 → R be the function x −. y := max(x − y, 0) and let D denote
the set of dyadic rational numbers.
Fact 2.5. ([2, Corollary 9.8]) For a sentence ϕ, we have
sup{ϕA : A |= TII1} = inf{r ∈ D
>0 : TII1 ⊢ ϕ−
. r}.
We denote this common value by ϕTII1 .
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Remark 2.6. By Downward Löwenheim-Skolem, every tracial von Neumann
algebra has a separable subalgebra with the same theory. Consequently, we
have that
ϕTII1 = sup{ϕ
A : A |= TII1 and A is separable}.
2.1. CEP and Model Theory. At this point, it is convenient to recall the
connection between CEP and model theory. If A,B are tracial von Neumann
algebras and A is a subalgebra of B, then Th∀(A) ≤ Th∀(B) (as functions).
SinceR embeds into any II1 factor, we have that Th∀(R) ≤ Th∀(A) for every
II1 factor A. If A is a R
ω-embeddable II1 factor, then certainly Th∀(A) ≤
Th∀(R) (as Th(R) = Th(R
U )). Conversely, suppose that A is a separable
tracial von Neumann algebra such that Th∀(A) ≤ Th∀(R). It is then a
standard fact of model theory that A is Rω-embeddable. We thus see that
CEP is equivalent to the statement that, for every II1 factor A, we have
that Th∀(A) = Th∀(R). (Actually, we just saw that CEP is equivalent
to the statement that, for every separable tracial von Neumann algebra A
containing R, we have Th∀(A) = Th∀(R).) As a side remark, it is an
exercise to see that, for tracial von Neumann algebras A and B, we have
Th∀(A) = Th∀(B) if and only if Th∃(A) = Th∃(B), which is easily seen to
be equivalent to the Microstate Conjecture.
3. CEP implies Computability
In this section, we assume that CEP holds. For ease of notation, we set
T := TII1 .
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that σ is universal. Then σT = σ
R.
Proof. By definition, σR ≤ σT . Now fix a separable II1 factor M ; we must
show σM ≤ σR. This follows immediately from the fact that M is Rω
embeddable. 
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that σ is existential. Then σT = σ
R.
Proof. Again, it suffices to show that σM ≤ σR for arbitrary M |= T . But
this follows from the fact that M contains a copy of R. 
Corollary 3.3. If σ is a universal sentence, then (Mσ −
. σ)T = Mσ −
. σT .
Proof. Observe that Mσ−
. σ is logically equivalent to an existential sentence.
Using the previous two lemmas, we have
(Mσ −. σ)T = (Mσ −. σ)
R = Mσ −. σ
R = Mσ −. σT .

If A is a tracial von Neumann algebra, we say that Th∀(A) is computable if
there is an algorithm such that, upon inputs universal sentence σ and positive
dyadic rational number ǫ, returns an interval I ⊆ R of length at most ǫ with
dyadic rational endpoints such that σA ∈ I. One defines Th∃(A) being
computable in an analogous way.
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Remark 3.4. This is not the same notion of computable theory as defined
in [2] but is more appropriate for our needs.
Corollary 3.5. Th∀(R) and Th∃(R) are computable.
Proof. Here is the algorithm: given universal σ and positive dyadic rational
ǫ, run all proofs from T and wait until you see that T ⊢ σ −. r and T ⊢
(Mσ −
. σ) −. s where r − (Mσ − s) ≤ ǫ. By the previous corollary, this
algorithm will eventually halt and the interval [Mσ− s, r] will be the desired
interval. 
4. Computability implies CEP
Recall that NCEP implies that there are at least two distinct universal
(equivalently existential) theories of type II1 algebras. In fact:
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that CEP fails. Then there are continuum many
different universal (equivalently existential) theories of type II1 algebras. In
fact, there is a single existential sentence σ such that σM takes on continuum
many values as M ranges over all type II1 algebras.
Proof. For N ∈ N, A a type II1 algebra, a a tuple from M , and ǫ > 0, let
σN,A,a,ǫ be the existential sentence
inf
x
max
deg p≤N
max(| trℜ(p(x))− trℜ(p(a))|, | trℑ(p(x))− trℑ(p(a))|).
Since CEP fails, there are N , A, a, and ǫ > 0 such that σRN,A,a,ǫ > 0. (Of
course σAN,A,a,ǫ = 0.) For simplicity, set σ := σN,A,a,ǫ and r := σ
R. For each
t ∈ [0, 1], set At := tR⊕ (1− t)A, which denotes the direct sum of R and A
with trace trt := t trR+(1 − t) trA. Note that each At is a type II1 algebra
and the map t 7→ σAt : [0, 1] → R is continuous. Since σA0 = 0 and σA1 = r,
the proof of the proposition is complete. 
Corollary 4.2. Suppose that the universal theory of every type II1 algebra
is computable. Then CEP holds.
Proof. Suppose that CEP fails. By the previous lemma, there are uncount-
ably many universal theories of type II1 algebras. But there are only count-
ably many programs that could be computing universal theories of type II1
algebras, whence not every type II1 algebra has a computable universal the-
ory. 
5. Further computability-theoretic consequences of the CEP
In this section, we assume that CEP holds and we derive some further
computability-theoretic results. Unlike Section 3, in this section, we let
T denote the set of sentences whose models are the tracial von Neumann
algebras (see Remark 2.2).
Fix a separable II1 factor A with enumerated subset X = (a0, a1, a2, . . .)
that generates A (as a von Neumann algebra). We now pass to a language LX
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containing L obtained by adding to L new constant symbols for each ai. We
now add to T sentences of the form max(rn −
. f(~a), f(~a)−. sn), where f ∈ F
and (rn, sn) is a sequence of intervals of dyadic rationals containing f(~a)
with sn − rn → 0; we call the resulting theory T(A,X). (In model-theoretic
lingo: we are just adding the atomic diagram of A to T .) Note that a model
of T(A,X) is a tracial von Neumann algebra B whose interpretations of the
new constants generate a von Neumann subalgebra of B isomorphic to A.
We say that (A,X) as above is recursively presented if there is an algorithm
that enumerates each sequence of intervals (rn, sn) for each f ∈ F . It is a
standard construction in recursion theory to code a recursively presented
tracial von Neumann algebra (A,X) by a single natural number, which we
refer to as the Gödel code of (A,X).
Fix a recursively presented II1 factor (A,X). Suppose that σ = supx ϕ(x)
is a universal sentence and ǫ is a positive dyadic rational. Then clearly there
is n ∈ N such that σA ≤ maxi≤n ϕ(ai)
A + ǫ; we will say that such an n is
good for (A,X, σ, ǫ). Consider the following algorithmic question: is there
a way of computably determining some n that is good for (A,X, σ, ǫ)? The
next result tells us that CEP implies that there is a single algorithm that
works for all recursively presented (A,X) and all σ and ǫ.
Theorem 5.1. There is a computable partial function f : N×N×D>0 ⇀ N
such that, if e is the Gödel code of a recursively presented separable II1 factor
(A,X) and n is the Gödel code of a universal sentence σ = supx ϕ(x), then
f(m,n, ǫ) is good for (A,X, σ, ǫ).
Proof. Here is the algorithm for determining f(m,n, ǫ). First, use the com-
putability of Th∀(R) to determine an interval I = [c, d] ⊆ R with |I| ≤
ǫ
2
such that σR ∈ I. By CEP, σR = σA. We claim that there is an N such that
c− ǫ2 ≤ ϕ(aN )
A. Indeed, there is N such that σA − ǫ2 ≤ ϕ(aN )
A. For such
an N , we have that c− ǫ2 ≤ ϕ(aN )
A ≤ σA ≤ d and d− (c− ǫ2 ) ≤ ǫ, whence
N is good for (A,X, σ, ǫ). Now we just start computing ϕ(ai)
A (which we
can do since (A,X) is recursively presented) and wait until we reach N with
c− ǫ2 ≤ ϕ(aN )
A. 
Note that there is a countable X ⊆ R such that (R,X) is recursively
presented. In the rest of this paper, we fix such an X and let TR := T(R,X)
and let RX denote the obvious expansion of R to an LX-structure.
In the next proof, we will need the following fact (see [5, Lemma 3.1]):
Fact 5.2. For any nonprincipal ultrafilter U on N, any embedding h : R→
RU is elementary, that is, for any formula ϕ(~x), and any tuple ~a ∈ R, we
have ϕR(~a) = ϕR
U
(h(~a)).
Lemma 5.3. Suppose that σ is a universal or existential LX-sentence. Then
σTR = σ
RX .
Proof. As in Section 3, we need only show that σM ≤ σRX for every M |=
TR. First suppose that σ is existential, say σ = infx ϕ(ca, x), where a is a
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tuple from X and ca is the corresponding tuple of constants. Let i : R→M
be the embedding of R into M determined by setting i(a) := cMa for every
a ∈ X. Then
σM = inf{ϕ(i(a), b)M : b ∈M} ≤ inf{ϕ(i(a), i(d))M : d ∈ R} = σRX .
Now suppose that σ is universal, say σ = supx ϕ(ca, x). Fix an embedding
j : M → RU . Then
σM = sup{ϕ(i(a), b)M : b ∈M} ≤ sup{ϕ(ji(a), d)R
U
: d ∈ RU} = σRX ,
since ji : R→ RU is elementary. 
Corollary 5.4. Th∀(RX) and Th∃(RX) are computable.
Proof. This follows from the previous lemma just as in Section 3. 
Define Th∃∀(R) to be the restriction of Th(R) to the set of formulae of
the form
Q1x1∈B1 · · ·Q
k
xk∈Bk
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn),
where ϕ is quantifier-free, k ≤ n, and such that there is l ∈ {1, . . . , k} such
that Qi = inf for i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and Qi = sup for i ∈ {l + 1, k}.
We say that Th∃∀(R) is upper computably enumerable if there is an al-
gorithm that enumerates all sentences of the form σ −. s, where σ is an
∃∀-sentence and s is a dyadic rational with σR < s.
Corollary 5.5. Th∃∀(R) is upper computably enumerable.
Proof. Consider (for simplicity) the sentence infx supy ϕ(x, y). For each a ∈
X and ǫ ∈ D>0, use the previous corollary to find an interval I = [r, s] with
dyadic endpoints of length ≤ ǫ such that supy ϕ(a, y)
R ∈ I. We then add
the condition infx supy ϕ(a, y) ≤ s to our enumeration. We claim that this
algorithm shows that Th∃∀(R) is upper computably enumerable. Indeed,
suppose that infx supy ϕ(x, y) = s. Fix s
′ ∈ D, s < s′. Fix δ ∈ D>0 such that
s+ 2δ < s′. We claim that when the algorithm encounters a ∈ X such that
supy ϕ(a, y)
R ≤ s+δ, our algorithm will let us know that infx supy ϕ(x, y) ≤
s′. Indeed, our algorithm will tell us that infx supy ϕ(x, y) ≤ d, where d ∈
D
>0 and d ≤ supy ϕ(a, y)
R + δ. 
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